


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## STAFF NOTES:

# Soviet Union Eastern Europe


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
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SOVIET UNION - EASTERN EUROPE

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*C O N T E N T S*

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Recent Soviet Comment on China

Routine Soviet propaganda has picked up the campaign in China involving the novel "Water Margin" but has touched only lightly on the Soviet aspects of the campaign. This is to be expected, however, as Moscow has generally been slow to comment authoritatively on internal Chinese policies.

Moscow, as might be expected, is interpreting the campaign as evidence of continuing factional strife in China, particularly between Chairman Mao Tse-tung and unnamed opponents. If anything, there seems to be a tendency to suggest that the campaign is not a significant departure and that the ideologically deviant Chinese "capitulationists" of today are no different than the "revisionists" of yesterday.

The USSR has not yet taken up the recent Chinese article that can be interpreted as a defense of Lin Piao. This article creates problems for the Soviets in view of earlier Chinese charges that Lin was pro-Soviet. Though the Soviets frequently played up the existence of positive forces within Chinese society, they rarely suggest publicly, or privately, that there is any particular faction or person in China who favors a change toward a less hostile policy to the USSR.

The Soviets are pressing their attack on Chinese foreign policy. *Izvestia* on Wednesday picked up a theme first sounded in a *Kommunist* article in mid-August contending that "Maoism" posed a threat to the non-communist world as well as the communist camp. *Izvestia* warned those who "play the China card" of the folly of pursuing a Munich-style policy of appeasement toward the Chinese.

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The *Izvestia* article seems aimed at Asians, like the Thais and the Filipinos, who moved to improve relations with Peking in the wake of the communist victories in Indochina. The article suggests concern that China's early recognition of the new government in Bangladesh may threaten Moscow's position in South Asia.

China's leaders, according to *Izvestia*, are aware of the "extreme danger" of a direct military provocation against the USSR, but are not against trying their luck in other directions, particularly in South and Southeast Asia.

Moscow is privately playing down the significance of the *Kommunist* article. Mikhail Kapitsa, the Foreign Ministry's Asian expert, told Ambassador Stoessel that he had seen the draft last spring, that it was the work of "propagandists," and did not portend any shift in Soviet policy toward China.

This is the third year in a row that the mid-August issue of *Kommunist* has carried a major article on China. The text of this article is not available in Washington, but new charges against the Chinese appear in excerpts we have.

Mao, for example, is charged with institutionalizing China's anti-Sovietism. This is a reference to the anti-Soviet language in the revised Chinese constitution and suggests again that Moscow does not expect Peking to be any more pro-Soviet once Mao leaves.

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Some Soviet Non-conformists Planning a "Gesture"?

A brief press report from Moscow suggests that a splinter group of an unknown number of dissident artists will try to stage an unauthorized, open-air art show this weekend to mark the first anniversary of last year's "art massacre" [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] The artists, mainly from outside of Moscow, are evidently those who last week balked at the compromise reached between the majority of the non-conformists and the regime granting a large, indoor show to begin on September 20. The agreement limited the exhibit to Moscow residents.

Edward Zelenin, a painter identified as a would-be participant in the planned outdoor show, was reportedly arrested last Wednesday at his home in Vladimir, 110 miles east of Moscow. His mother has reportedly quoted police as saying he would be released by September 25, suggesting that Zelenin will be kept out of circulation until well after the anniversary on September 15 of last year's fiasco.

The scope of the mavericks' plans are not known, and a clash of some kind on Sunday in Moscow cannot be ruled out, but the regime's demonstrated concern over adverse publicity suggests it will try keeping all of Zelenin's recalcitrant colleagues out of circulation for a while. Regime officials may also seek to induce Moscow's unconventional artists to dissuade the splinter group from the rump venture in order not to jeopardize the arrangements for their own authorized exhibit.

Meanwhile, the officially sanctioned, ten-day exhibit by Leningrad's unorthodox artists opened there on Wednesday in a calm and orderly fashion.

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The show, marred only by the protests of three artists barred from exhibiting, was reportedly mentioned by Leningrad radio three days before its opening. This is the first time in recent memory that official media have given advance notice of a non-conformist exhibit.

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AnnexSoviet Relations with the US  
(August 12-September 12, 1975)

The traditional late-summer doldrums have been punctuated this year by several developments of significance to US-Soviet relations. The most promising has been Moscow's increased public attention to arms control issues. Since the CSCE finale, the Soviets have repeatedly--if often vaguely--professed commitment to further progress toward curbing the arms race. They appear keenly aware that efforts to stabilize the strategic balance provide much of the glue binding together the bilateral relationship, especially as, elsewhere, new problems are compounding old obstacles to better relations. US statements and actions regarding the European security agreement, grain sales, Portugal, and the Middle East have discomfited the Soviets.

After the rosy afterglow of the Helsinki summit had quickly begun to fade, a cloud of concern and suspicion emerged as Moscow's US watchers puzzled over the American debate of detente issues. With a measure of apprehension and uncertainty, the Soviets are trying to gauge the mood of the US and to sort out the tangle of US politics. Brezhnev interrupted his Black Sea vacation to meet and talk with visiting congressmen; Kosygin received a Democratic presidential candidate.

Arms Control

The Soviets clearly regard SALT as the current centerpiece of their detente policy. In recent weeks they have endeavored publicly to put the best face on the Geneva negotiations, which have in fact significantly narrowed the differences separating the

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two sides. A Tass commentator on August 19 bristled at Western predictions of an impasse in the talks and claimed that President Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev had agreed in Helsinki on a number of SALT issues. In his meeting with US congressmen last month, Brezhnev himself minimized the remaining difficulties as purely technical issues.

In a less complicated set of negotiations, the sides reached final agreement last month on a draft convention on the prohibition of environmental warfare. The proposed text--submitted by both nations on August 21 to the Geneva Disarmament Conference--would ban modification of the environment for military or other hostile purposes. US-Soviet agreement on this issue meets a goal set at the Moscow summit in 1974.

Progress is also being made toward agreement on the details of another arms limitation objective defined at that summit, the limitation of underground nuclear weapons tests to an upper threshold of 150 kilotons.

The fourth round of talks on that subject convened in Moscow on September 8. Central to their success is agreement on mutual constraints on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. As a result of progress on this issue during earlier rounds, the US is preparing to table a draft agreement on peaceful nuclear explosions.

In contrast to the generally constructive atmosphere of these bilateral negotiations, Soviet propaganda continues to hit hard at the US "military-industrial complex." Secretary Schlesinger remains a favorite target for attack, especially for his statements on US nuclear employment policy, but also for such old favorites as the level of US defense spending.

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Moscow on Detente and the US Political Scene

The military-industrial complex, in Soviet eyes, is but one of a formidable array of US opponents of improved relations with the USSR. Others include "Zionists," US labor leaders, and "reactionary" politicians of both parties.

Moscow is plainly worried about a resurgence of anti-Soviet feeling in the US. Warnings of machinations by "enemies of detente" have become a staple of Soviet commentary.

Moscow is also worried about the Ford administration's adherence to a policy of detente, harboring doubts on the one hand about the depth of the administration's commitment and, on the other, concern over its ability to withstand what the Soviets see as steadily growing anti-detente political pressure.

Moscow probably interpreted the President's tough speech in Minneapolis last month as an effort to adjust to or relieve this pressure. In that instance, as it has in others, the Soviets in their domestic media treatment of the event censored the President's warnings to Moscow, evidently loathe to provoke embarrassing questions about the health of detente. In contrast, the Soviets have been quick to report statements by the President and the Secretary of State in support of detente. They have been particularly eager to stress administration assurances that the US is receiving as much as it gives in its new relationship with the USSR.

For the public record, the Soviets profess confidence that "progressive" and "realistic" forces in the US retain popular support, despite frantic counterattacks by increasingly anachronistic reactionaries. Articles appearing prominently in

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the Soviet press earlier this month by two senior members of the USA Institute, including director Arbatov, argued forcefully that detente is and must remain a success for all the zig-zags of Western policy. Yet appearance of these articles betrays the concern they were intended to allay.

### Problems

Moscow has reacted angrily to the new Sinai disengagement agreement. One Soviet commentator implied in a broadcast on September 2 that the US had ignored its detente commitments to the USSR in seeking partial solutions at the expense of the Soviet role in the Arab world. Moscow has been especially unhappy about the proposed introduction of US technicians.

The Soviets have also found themselves on the defensive in reacting to US and other Western probes of Soviet compliance with the provisions of the European security agreement. Moscow grumbled that the US was acting with unseemly haste in pressing immediately for improvements in Soviet visa procedures. The Soviets have made it plain that the Helsinki accord is no license to "interfere" in Soviet internal affairs. During the visit of House Speaker Albert and other congressmen, Brezhnev and Politburo candidate member Ponomarev offered them no encouragement that Soviet emigration policy would be substantially altered, although their interest in greater trade with the US apparently remains strong. Nonetheless, Moscow continues to show sensitivity to Western pressure on the issue of dissidents and emigrants. In one such case, a well-known Jewish "refusenik" was eventually permitted this month to attend an international scientific gathering in Tbilisi.

The Soviets have maintained public silence on the controversy in the US over grain sales with the

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
exception of one commentary that was broadcast to North America on August 19. In that instance the Soviets heatedly rebutted charges that grain sales to the USSR were fueling inflation in the US. Otherwise, Moscow has been characteristically reluctant to air the facts of Soviet dependence on the West. Soviet media have made no mention of the dispatch to Moscow of a US negotiating team seeking a more stable grain trade arrangement.

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